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U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  M I C H I G A N  
OURNAL of  LAW REFORM ONLINE 
COMMENT 
WHY AMERICAN EXPRESS v. ITALIAN COLORS DOES NOT 
MATTER AND COORDINATED PURSUIT OF AGGREGATE 
CLAIMS MAY BE A VIABLE OPTION AFTER CONCEPCION 
Gregory C. Cook* 
This Comment suggests that the upcoming decision by the 
Supreme Court in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors 
Restaurant1 will not change the class action landscape. While the 
plaintiff bar contends that certain public policy goals will be lost 
as a result of American Express and AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion,2 this Comment argues that, in the correct 
circumstances, coordinated individual arbitrations can address at 
least some of these public policy goals and plaintiff counsel 
should focus on such coordination efforts (including, for instance, 
ethically recruiting actually-injured plaintiffs, the use of common 
plaintiff counsel, the use of common experts, and shared 
discovery). 
To begin with, I believe that American Express will likely win 
its motion to compel arbitration. This is not surprising in light of 
the breadth of Concepcion, which appeared to foreclose any attack 
upon an arbitration clause with a class action waiver simply 
because “small dollar claims … might … slip through the legal 
system.”3 Moreover, the two major prior discussions by the 
Supreme Court of the vindication of rights doctrine at issue 
in American Express were likely dicta, and such dicta appears 
narrowly targeted to cases where the arbitration clause, rules, or 
                                                   
*  Gregory C. Cook is Chair of the Financial Services Litigation Group of 
Balch & Bingham LLP, former chair of the ABA’s Class Action and Derivative Suits 
Committee, and Chair of the Business Torts and Antitrust Section of the Alabama State 
Bar. He has written and spoken broadly on class actions. He is a 1991magna cum 
laude graduate of Harvard Law School. 
1. 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (granting cert.). 
2. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
3. Id. at 1753. 
J 
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procedure expressly limited a remedy or a right.4 
Even if American Express were to lose, however, the class 
action landscape would probably not change 
significantly. American Express involves a federal statutory claim 
under the Sherman Act.5 Therefore, it does not concern 
preemption like Concepcion, but rather a conflict between two 
federal statutes: the Federal Arbitration Act6 and the Sherman 
Act. A decision for the plaintiff would likely not translate into 
state law causes of action because such  an argument would seem 
to be virtually indistinguishable from a state law 
unconscionability analysis. Both arguments are simply different 
articulations of the argument that enforcement of the arbitration 
clause would be exculpatory for the defendant (and likewise 
would appear to be another articulation of the “public policy” 
argument rejected by many lower courts).7 
Even the field of federal causes of action that might be 
impacted by American Express appears to be small because of the 
substantial incentives to bring most federal statutory claims—
including attorney fees, treble damages and statutory 
damages.8 These types of remedies (particularly attorney fees) 
have historically been sufficient to satisfy many state law 
unconscionability tests and would therefore likely defeat most 
vindication of rights exculpatory arguments made by plaintiffs in 
4. E.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637
(1985) (explaining that there’s no indication that international arbitration is unsuitable to 
handle certain unfair competition claims arising out of national law); Green Tree Fin. 
Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (rejecting as speculative the plaintiff’s 
argument that the high costs of arbitration will prevent the plaintiff from vindicating her 
rights). 
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. See generally Transcript of Oral
Argument, American Express, 2013 WL 705521 (Feb. 27, 2013). 
6. 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. 
7. See Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2011) (rejecting an
effort to avoid arbitration based upon a public policy argument—involving a state law 
claim—but  reserving the vindication of rights argument while appearing to question its 
application to state law claims); Booker v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 413 F.3d 77, 79, 81–83 
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (using language that might apply this doctrine more broadly); Brewer v. 
Mo. Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d 486 (Mo.) (en banc), cert denied, 133 S.Ct. 191 (2012) (applying 
vindication of rights to state law claims). 
8. Examples include Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. §1601, et seq.; Fair
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq.; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.; or the  Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 
U.S.C. § 2601 (among others). 
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federal claims as well. In other words, any decision for the 
plaintiffs in American Express would likely be relegated to unique 
circumstances where the costs (such as expert witness fees, as 
argued in American Express) to pursue a federal claim alone 
would be prohibitive for plaintiffs. 
A win for American Express, however, certainly does not mean 
that it will be released from liability. Undoubtedly, many lawyers 
will continue to pursue claims in arbitration against American 
Express for the kind of antitrust tying arrangements present in the 
current case.9 These claims involve hundreds of millions, or even 
billions, of dollars of potential damages (not to mention statutory 
attorney fees) against American Express. More importantly, a win 
for American Express does not mean that there is no opportunity 
for economies of scale of aggregated litigation in the right 
circumstances. As discussed below, such economies of scale might 
occur with the use of common plaintiff counsel, common experts, 
shared discovery, and the ability of plaintiff counsel to learn facts 
from many different plaintiffs rather than a single class 
representative. While some merchants may have only small 
claims, even smaller merchants would be entitled to attorney fees 
and treble damages. Additionally, larger merchants have 
significant claims and would certainly blaze the path for others to 
pursue their claims through arbitration. In past lawsuits, claims 
for some class members (particularly in antitrust actions) have 
reached or exceeded a million dollars.10 Such arbitrations can be 
pursued in an aggregate fashion even if not officially joined. 
Merchants can (and undoubtedly will) share lawyers and experts, 
for example. 
Changes in the litigation world in the last twenty years create 
additional opportunities for aggregated litigation. Plaintiff firms 
today can routinely assemble large groups of plaintiffs 
(depending upon the particular circumstances),11 and it is not just 
9. In re American Express Merchants’ Litigation, 667 F.3d 204, 208 (2nd Cir. 2012)
(plaintiff claims that American Express has tied its “charge card” product, where it has 
market power to charge higher fees to merchants, to its “credit card” product with its 
“honor all cards” rule and argues that this is an antitrust violation). 
10. E.g., In re W. Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1566 (D. Nev.)
(reaching multiple settlements and payouts, some into millions of dollars, for some 
corporate class members). 
11. Jack Weinstein, The Democratization of Mass Actions in the Internet Age, 45
Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 451, 455 (2012) (arguing that “we are seeing a shift from class 
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the advent of advertising that has made this possible. The 
Internet, electronic communications, and trade associations have 
dramatically improved communications and coordination 
between potential plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ counsel. The academic 
literature is just now beginning to grapple with this 
assembly/coordination trend and the leverage that it may create 
for plaintiffs in the right circumstances, thereby diminishing any 
perceived negative impacts of an opinion in favor of American 
Express.12
An example of how such coordination can work is the large 
number of individual actions filed in litigation by common 
counsel for alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices 
Act (FDCPA),13 often against the same defendant.14 The attorneys’ 
fees in those cases are provided for under the statute.15 There are 
other examples of larger volume filings of small dollar individual 
actions in federal court: the ATM notice cases; some ADA claims, 
the spam fax cases; the FACTA cases on expiration dates on 
receipts, although each of these claims has also sometimes been 
filed in a class forum.16
actions to aggregate forms of independent actions” and discussing generally examples of 
aggregate forms of independent actions). 
12. Judge Weinstein recently wrote about this in The Democratization of Mass Actions 
in the Internet Age, 45 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 451 (2012) (noting the potential 
advantages of such a participatory model over the class action representative model and 
discussing “quasi-class actions” in response toConcepcion). See also Robert Klonoff, Mark 
Merrmann & Bradley Harrison, Making Class Actions Work: The Untapped Potential of the 
Internet, 69 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 727, 737–44 (2008) (itemizing the coordination tools, internet 
sites, and tools available to assemble plaintiffs and used to coordinate among plaintiffs 
involved in various forms of aggregate litigation); Elizabeth Burch, Litigating Groups, 61 
Ala. L. Rev. 1, 56–57 (2009) (arguing that a community can be developed in mass litigation 
to lead to maximizing behavior for the entire group, including with the use of technology). 
13. 15 U. S. C. §1692 et seq.
14. Chris Serres, Debtors in Court – Suing Collectors, Minnesota Star Tribune (Mar.
17, 2011, 4:39 PM), http://www.startribune.com/investigators/99676349.html?refer=y (“High-
volume consumer law firms are churning out lawsuits as efficiently as the collectors they 
battle.”). 
15. 15 USC § 1692k.
16. E.g., Lisa Napoli, Technology; Crusaders Against Junk Faxes Brandish
Lawsuit, N.Y. Times 1, 1 (Dec. 16, 2003) (discussing the spam fax cases); Chris 
Driskill  & Derek Edwards, Senate Passes Bill (H.R. 4367) to End ATM Fee Decal Cases, The 
Banking Law Connection (Dec. 20, 2012),
 http://www.bankinglawconnection.com/2012/12/20/senate-passes-bill-to-end-atm-fee-decal-
cases/ (discussing the wave of ATM notice lawsuits); Credit and Debit Card Receipt 
Clarification Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–241, §  2(a)(4), 122 Stat. 1565 (2008) (“Almost 
immediately… hundreds of lawsuits were filed alleging that the failure to remove the 
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Such aggregate claims pursued by common plaintiff counsel 
may create efficiencies of scale, depending upon the facts. As the 
oral argument in American Express reflected, plaintiffs can share 
experts.17 Plaintiffs’ lawyers can reduce or eliminate the number 
of necessary depositions. They may be able to use discovery and 
testimony from one arbitration repeatedly. Therefore, plaintiff’s 
counsel may find that the speed and informality of arbitration is 
actually an advantage in pursuing such coordinated individual 
actions. With all of this said, some claims may be better suited 
than others for such a strategy. Further, defendants may regret 
creating such mass actions because it will be harder to settle such 
large inventories of individual actions as opposed to settling a 
single class action. 
Finally, I should note that there remain some avenues 
around Concepcion that minimize any potential unfairness 
complained of by plaintiffs’ counsel. Contract formation 
defenses—such as fraud, duress, and certain defenses relating to 
mutuality—or claims against the fact of formation at all continue 
to exist. For instance, there is an emerging line of mutuality cases 
where the corporate party tried reserving to itself the unilateral 
right to modify the arbitration clause, and some courts have held 
this to be unenforceable.18 There are also cases discussing whether 
or not an arbitration clause can be unconscionable for a reason 
other than a class action waiver.19 In addition, the question of 
whether the arbitration clause is even a part of the contract has 
been litigated heavily recently.20
expiration date was a willful violation of the Fair Credit reporting Act…”); Businesses Hit 
With Dubious “Handicapped Access” Lawsuits, Broward County Bar Association (Jan. 18, 
2012), http://www.browardbar.org/articles/93.html) (“Hundreds of businesses across South 
Florida have been hit with Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA premises”) lawsuits … 
Almost 200 lawsuits naming Carlisle Wilson as a plaintiff have targeted commercial 
establishments in Dade and Broward Counties.  All lawsuits were filed by attorneys William 
Tucker or Lawrence McGuiness.”). 
17. Transcript of Oral Argument at 1–5, American Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (granting cert.), 2013 WL 705521. 
18. Morrison v. Amway Corp., 517 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2008).
19. In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 485 Fed.Appx. 403, 406 (11th Cir. 2012).
20. E.g., NAACP of Camden Co. East v. Foulke Management Corp., 421 N.J. Super. 404
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (finding that confusion and inconsistency between 
arbitration provisions in different documents prevented formation); Plaintiffs’ Response In 
Opposition to U.S. Bank National Association’s Motion to Compel Arbitration, In 
re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., MDL No. 2036, (S.D. Fla. May 17, 2011) (No. 1:09-md-
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It is also a mistake to assert that corporate America will 
uniformly modify contracts to include arbitration. Making 
changes to an existing contract is not simple or costless. Corporate 
defendants make such changes cautiously and the marketplace 
can be a discipline on contract changes. In other words, 
corporations may decide not to include an arbitration clause for 
marketing reasons or may decide not to amend their contracts 
because amendment may have a marketing impact. Further, 
corporate defendants do not necessarily consistently maintain 
proof of signed contracts or amendments, meaning that plaintiffs 
will argue that the signed contract or amendment may be 
unenforceable. The Consumer Finance Protection Bureau may 
issue future regulations pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act,21 either 
regulating or prohibiting arbitration clauses. The National Labor 
Relations Board has also recently decided in D.R. Horton, Inc.22 to 
prohibit the use of arbitration clauses in certain employee 
contracts. 
I will finish with the admission that, as a public policy matter, 
arbitration can sometimes be a blunt instrument. I have defeated a 
number of class actions with this instrument, thereby saving my 
clients potentially tens of millions of dollars. I would strongly 
argue that these particular actions were meritless. Nevertheless, 
there are certainly some class actions that need to be brought, so 
how do we manage to sift the wheat from the chaff?  As argued in 
this Comment, I believe that, in the right circumstances, 
coordinated individual arbitrations can address at least some of 
the public policy goals which plaintiff counsel argue may be lost 
as a result of American Express and Concepcion , providing a 
useful tool for those plaintiffs who are alleging actual injury. 
While there is much left to be written, it does seem that aggregate 
actions (whether with class actions or coordinated arbitrations) are 
not dead. 
02036-JLK) (plaintiff brief making detailed argument on formation of contract for banking 
deposit agreement and formation of contract for later amendment of same). 
21. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5518(a)–(b) (Supp. IV 2010).
22. 357 NLRB No. 184, (2012).
